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Authoritative articles by outstanding scholars. Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church The single best one-volume overview of Church history, covering all periods. Sign in to Purchase Instantly. Temporarily Out of Stock Online Please check back later for updated availability. Overview A Heidegger Dictionary enables the student to read Heidegger's immensely rich and varied works with understanding, and assigns him to his rightful place in both contemporary philosophy and in the history of the subject. Notes on the use of this book.
Heidegger and his language. Dictionary Entries. Further reading. General index. This part never appeared, but its contents are familiar from Heidegger's other writings and lectures. The remainder of the Introduction explains the phenomenological and hermeneutical method of BT. The intended contents of I, 3 are uncertain. Heidegger says that he wrote it, but decided to omit it: 'The decision to break off was formed in the last days of December during a stay with Jaspers in Heidelberg.
From our lively, friendly discussions over the proofs it became clear to me that this most important division I, 3 , as I had worked it out so far, must remain unintelligible' XLIX, 39f. He regrets his inability to complete BT, but feels that other publications 'lead to the real question by detours' XLIX, 40; cf. HB, I, 3 was to involve a TURN, veer or swerve: fundamental ontology 'is: 1.
BT, I, 1 and 2], and 2. BT, I, 3]. But this temporal [temporale] analytic is also the turn [die Kehre], in which ontology itself explicitly runs back into the metaphysical ontics [Ontik] in which it always implicitly remains. We need, by the motion of radicalizing and universalizing, to bring ontology to the swerve [Umschlag] latent in it.
Meta-ontology, ontology 'about' or 'beyond' ontology, seems to involve reflection on beings as a whole in relation to being, which still depends on Dasein's understanding ofit XXVI, BT remains the focal point of Heidegger's thought to the end. He often discusses it later e. LXV, 10, etc. LH, ff. BT's focus on being, rather than beings, and the linking of being with time, rather than with thinking, represents an important first step towards the preoccupations of his later years LXV, , ff. It does not succumb to the man-centred metaphysic that he later condemned LXV, ff. It is, however, a work of 'transition', riddled with the vocabulary and presuppositions of the old metaphysics LXV, 93, , , XLIX, BT is often felt, even in its truncated form, to lack unity.
The theme of everyday circumspection, characteristic of I, 1 seems ill at ease with the Angst-ridden resoluteness characteristic of I, 2. One unifying thread is Heidegger's urge to reflect not just on the concerns of philosophy, but. What is the connection between everyday life and philosophy? What motivates us, and enables us, to philosophize?
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LXIII, 17ff. It seems a requirement of phenomenology that the desire and ability to philosophize be shown to cohere with, and to emerge from, Dasein's other features. Angst, authenticity, resoluteness: these are what the philosopher needs. Once Dasein has, in I, 2, become a philosopher, then it can ascend, in I, 3, to being itself. Husserl, in his earlier writings, neglected the emergence of philosophy from average everydayness; Heidegger like another great phenomenologist, Hegel laid it to heart.
Originally bei meant 'close, near'; it is related to 'by' in 'bystander'. It corresponds to no single English preposition: Tt is by the station', 'He's at home', 'She went to the doctor's', 'He worked on the railway'. He uses a compound verbal noun, das Mitsein, for 'being-with' others. He does not use Beisein for 'being alongside' things, but Sein-bei BT, or Sein bei BT, , perhaps because Beisein already has a meaning too restricted for his purpose, 'presence' 'in his presence'. Sein bei, Mitsein and Selbstsein 'being-one'sself are three co-ordinate constituents of being-in-the-WORLD, corresponding to the Umwelt, the 'world around one', the Mitwelt, the 'with-world, people around one' BT, and the earlier Selbstwelt e.
LXIII, Heidegger also uses Mitdasein, 'Dasein-with', for the being or the Dasein of others, but not usually for others themselves, and Miteinandersein, 'being-with-one-another' BT, f. The self must not be separated from Sein-bei and Mitsein. Since both subjects are underdetermined, a more elaborate arrangement must as it were be found than the nature of the case requires. The underdetermination of subjectivity causes an overdetermination of the relation between subjects' XXVII, If people are self-enclosed subjects, they have to undertake a careful inspection of each other's physical characteristics before they can communicate.
Plainly this is not the case. I am 'with' others even when they are not physically. Mit einander sein does not involve focusing on each other: two ramblers gripped by the same view are 'with each other' without attending to each other. Mitsein requires Sein-bei, in particular our ability to be bei one and the same thing. When two or more people see die same piece of chalk they do not see it as exactiy similar; they have different views on the same chalk and thus see it in different ways: 'Sameness [Selbigkeit] and exact similarity [Gleichheit] are two different things' XXVII, If we could not identify an object perceived by me as the same as the object perceived by you, we could not communicate or recognise each other as persons.
Even disagreement presupposes agreement about the thing we disagree about: 'Harmony and discord are thus based on establishing something the same and constant. Conversely, Sein-bei involves Mitsein. We do not first see diem as present-at-hand and then infer the existence of others from their physical contours. We see them at once as involving customers, suppliers, owners, users BT, f. As Heidegger becomes less preoccupied witii die ready-to-hand, he introduces other arguments: Dasein can, of course, be bei a thing in the absence of anyone else, while it cannot be with someone else without being bei something.
But what Dasein is bei, and its very Sein-bei, is in principle common and shareable with others. Sein-bei is not a feeler or a tube that Dasein sends out into the world. Thus 'if a Dasein approaches another Dasein it enters die space of visibility of die odier, more precisely their Sein-bei moves in the same sphere of visibility' XXVII, Even from a distance we recognize a man entering the door of his house; we transport ourselves into his Sein-bei, his perspective on the situation XXVII, f.
Though Sein-bei, Mitsein and Selbstsein are equiprimordial, they are not separable: each presupposes the others. Heidegger often turns it into a noun, das Zwischen, 'the between, what is between, betweenness'. More significandy, in considering the view that being-in-the-world is die 'present-at-hand commerce between a present-at-hand subject and a present-at-hand object', he suggests that it would be phenomenologically more accurate to say that 'Dasein is die being of this "between" BT, This echoes earlier lectures: Dasein is not the world and not a subject; the 'being of Dasein is precisely the "between" subject and world.
This "between", which does not of course arise from a subject's coming together with a world, is Dasein itself, but again not as a property of a subject! For diis reason it is not stricdy correct to conceive Dasein as "between", since talk of a "between" subject and world always already presupposes that two entities are given and between them a relation is to obtain' XX, ; cf. The 'between' also applies to Dasein's career between birth and death.
Dasein does not simply live in each present moment; its 'stretching out' between its beginning and its end colours its whole life: 'The "between" in relation to birth and death already lies in Dasein's very being. Bodi "ends" and their "between" are, as long as Dasein factically exists, and they are in the only way possible on the basis of Dasein's being as care. Heidegger makes ample use of the between later.
Sometimes being is. Nor are odiers undifferentiated 'specimens of die natural scientist's genus homo sapiens'; the Mitwelt is 'other people in an entirely definite characterization as student, teacher, relative, superior, e t c ' LX, Whether we can do this with world-impoverished animals, even pets, is a difficult question; we do so in what is, compared with our 'going with [Mitgehen]' other humans, a 'deficient mode' XXIX, f; ff.
Beyng is 'the between in whose self-lighting essencing, gods and man re-cognize [er-kennen] each other, i. As this between beyng "is" no supplement to beings, but that essencer [Wesende] in whose truth beings [das Seiende ] can first reach the safekeeping of a being [eines Seienden]. But this priority of the between must not be misinterpreted idealistically as die "apriori"' LXV, If 'beyng is conceived as the between into which the gods are coerced, so that it is a need for man, then gods and man cannot be assumed as "given", "present-at-hand".
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Sometimes the between is Dasein: 'Dasein, that between, which, first grounding itself, brings god and man apart and together and fits them to each other' LXV, 28f. Dasein is not identical to man. Man 'stands like a bridge in the between', with one foot in beyng, one foot out LXV, In reading Kant's attempt to show how we can know beings that we have not made, we must not focus on the object, or on our experience of it, but realize: ' 1.
Sorge, 'care', is 'properly the anxiety, worry arising out of apprehensions concerning the future and refers as much to the external cause as the inner state' DGS, The verb sorgen is 'to care' in two senses: a sich sorgen um is 'to worry, be worried about' something; b sorgen fiiris 'to take care of, see to, provide for ' someone or something. The nominalized infinitive is das Besorgen, 'concern' in the sense of 'concerning onself with or about' somediing. BT, ; b 'care, solicitude'.
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These three concepts enable Heidegger to distinguish his own view from the view that our attitude towards the world is primarily cognitive and theoretical. But Sorge is not specifically practical: it lies deeper than the customary contrast between theory and practice BT, Care is the dominant member of the triad but inseparable from the others: Concern and solicitude are constitutive of care, so that when we use for short die term 'care' we always stricdy mean it, and in our concrete Care, rather than the persistence and self-awareness of an I or ego, or the continuity and coherence of experiences, makes Dasein a unified, autonomous self BT, ff.
Ontically, I save for a pension because the old man who draws it will be the same person as I am now 'me' ; ontologically, he will be the same person as I am now because I am saving for his pension. Thus I might save for someone else's pension, as long as I do not do so much for him that he loses his own care and becomes an appendage of myself. Care thus unifies Dasein's three central features: existentiality or 'beingahead-of-itself, facticity or 'being-already-in-a-world', and falling or 'beingalongside' entities within the world BT, , Thus: 'Temporality reveals itself to be the sense of authentic care': existentiality, facticity and falling correspond respectively to the future, past and present BT, In BT Sorge seems to pertain to Dasein's direction of its own life or 'being'.
Later, Heidegger insists that it is 'solely "for the sake of beyng", not the beyng of man, but the beyng of beings as a whole' LXV, 16; cf. XLIX, 54f. He speaks in oracular terms of the threefold task of man on the basis of 'Da-sein - care'; ' 1. Being has moved to the centre and Heidegger's thought is more historical: man must 1. The concepts are 'structural concepts', presenting existentials of DASEIN, and must thus be understood in a wide sense.
Often Dasein is slipshod and unconcerned, neglectful of others, and uncaring, carefree and careless. This is a common move in philosophy, not only in Heidegger: usually we regard some things as entirely unrelated, but for the logician any two things are related in some way or other; even unrelatedness is a sort of relation. In BT Besorgen is introduced as a general term for Dasein's multifarious dealings with things in the world: 'having to do with something, producing something, [. In its dealings, concern is guided not by knowledge or explicit rules, but by its informal know-how, by Umsicht, 'circumspection', the sort of Sicht, 'sight', that is involved in umsehen, 'looking around': 'the circumspection of concern is understanding as common sense' BT, Besorgen begins as a neutral term for Dasein in its 'average everydayness', used to 'highlight Dasein's being as care' BT, But it ends as an essential feature of the fallen Dasein to which conscience calls: 'The call reaches Dasein in this everyday-averagely concernful [besorgenden] always-already-understanding-itself BT, ; cf.
Besorgen thus contrasts with care: unlike care, Besorgen focuses on the present and on being alongside things within the world BT, Authenticity favours helping others to stand on their own two feet over reducing them to dependency. Standing on one's own two feet is Sorge. But this, like. It has three functions: 1. Witnessing: I judge that I have not done something morally relevant, e. Binding and inciting, i. Excusing or accusing, tormenting, rebuking: I judge that what I did was not done well. Summa Theologiae, la, 69, Conscience is not, for Aquinas, a 'voice' or a 'call' of God , nor does it involve a bifurcation of tile self.
Conscience is simply practical reasoning about moral matters, and thus as fallible as any other reasoning. The German Gewissen is not directly related to gewiss, 'certain', but was a translation of conscientia, using wissen, 'knowledge', and ge-, 'together,. Existential guilt is thus 'being the ground of a being [Sein] determined by a Not [Nicht, the existential counterpart of a lack of the present-at-hand], i.
We then look to see if, in what we have so far seen Dasein to be, we can find anything corresponding to this abstract definition. A involves Notness: Dasein is not in charge of its own entry into the world or the situation in which it finds itself; it does not decide where to start from or whether to start at all.
Thrown Dasein is the ground of B and C. Moreover, existence involves rejecting some possibilities in favour of others. A, that is Dasein II, grounds C, the fall from itself into Dasein I: if Dasein were not at bottom guilty and otherwise distressed, it could not fall from this condition nor have any reason to flee from it. In C Dasein takes refuge in the They and forgets about its essential guilt and its various nullities. But conscience and guilt play litde part in Heidegger's work after BT. Like conscientia, it referred initially to function 1 above, the knowledge of what one has or has not done.
But Heidegger insists that conscience is not the certainty that one has not done something and is thus not guilty an 'easy conscience' ; he dissociates Gewissen from gewiss BT, f. The 'existential interpretation [of conscience] needs to be confirmed by a critique of the way in which conscience is ordinarily interpreted' BT, The 'ordinary interpretation' differs from Heidegger's in four respects: 1. Conscience has a critical function. It always tells us about a definite deed that has been performed or willed.
The basic form of conscience, neglected by Heidegger, is the 'bad' and the 'good' conscience, that which reproves and that which warns BT, Heidegger differs from Aquinas, though not from the 'ordinary interpretation', in supposing conscience to involve a bifurcation of Dasein into a caller and a called. Dasein is two-tiered: I. It is involved in significant worldly affairs under the sway of the THEY. It calls it to nothing definite: naked Dasein II has nothing definite to say. Thus it does not prescribe a definite course of action, nor does it recommend a permanent state of homeless Angst.
It calls on Dasein I to consider its own possibilities, rather than the menu offered by the They, and to choose for itself what to do. Dasein is essentially guilty BT, ff. Dasein is guilty, but Dasein I overlooks, flees, this guilt. Dasein II summons Dasein I to explicit, authentic guilt. Schuldigsein and its cognates have four ordinary senses: a owing something, having debts; b being responsible, to blame, for something; c making onself responsible, punishable for, being guilty of breaking a law ; d wronging, coming to owe something to, others.
Heidegger prefers sense d , which amounts to: 'Being the ground of a lack in the Dasein of an other, in such a way that this very being a ground determines itself as "lacking" on the basis of that for which it is the ground' BT, If I break someone's nose, the broken nose is a lack, and I too am lacking or deficient in view of the lack that I bring about. We must interpret this not in the usual way, which involves. It was first published in as volume 65 of Heidegger's collected works.
It was composed while he was lecturing on Nietzsche and is not unlike Nietzsche's postfiumous notebooks, The Will to Power, in style and structure. Many of the central ideas in LXV - earth, gods, etc. LXV has eight parts, each containing sections numbered continuously through the work. Part I is Vorblick, 'Preview'. It opens with a complaint that all 'basic words' have become threadbare, so that we have to make do with a bland 'public' title such as 'Contributions to Philosophy'. However, the public title expresses the fact that LXV is not a definitive work, but the best that can be expected' in the age of transition from metaphysics to the thinking of the history of beyng [seynsgeschichtliche Denken]' 'an attempt to think from the more original starting-point in the question about the truth of beyng' LXV, 3.
We study the 'first beginning' instated by the Greeks in order to prepare for the 'other beginning' at some indeterminate future time. Conversely, our preparation for the other beginning enables us to understand the Greeks. Thus the first and the other beginning are like players co-operating by passing a ball to each other. This god is not the last god of the first beginning, but the god appropriate to the other beginning: 'The last god is not the end, but the other beginning of immeasurable possibilities of our history' LXV, It is difficult to discern a firm plan in LXV, especially since It is tempting to regard LXV as blocks of stone in a quarry, whose relationships are not apparent cf.
LXV, , Certain themes run through the book. It reveals religious yearning, and growing hostility to Nazism, which, though not mentioned by name, is unmistakably included in his denunciations of gigantomania e. LXV, ff. LXV, 18f. The difficulties it presents are in turn often eased by other writings and lectures, such as XLV. One such word is da. It means 'there' 'There they go' and 'here' 'Here they come' , as well as 'then', 'since', etc.
Prefixed to sein, 'to be' it forms dasein, 'to be there, present, available, to exist'. In the seventeenth century the infinitive was nominalized as das Dasein, originally in the sense of 'presence'. In the eighteenth century Dasein came to be used by philosophers as an alternative to the latinate Existenz 'the existence of God' , and poets used it in the sense of 'life'. Darwin's 'struggle for survival' became in German der Kampf ums Dasein.
Colloquially it is used for the being or life of persons. In BT he uses das Dasein for 1. In lectures he often speaks of das menschliche Dasein, 'human Dasein', and this too can mean either the being of humans or the human being e. XXIV, As a nominalized infinitive, Dasein has no plural. It refers to any and every human being, in much the way that das Seiende, lit. When more than one person is in play Heidegger speaks of the other s or Dasein-wifh Mitdasein. He revives the original sense, 'being there', often writing Da-sein to stress this.
In BT every man, however inauthentic, is Dasein. Children and early man are to be understood 'in a privative way', by noting how they fall short of fully fledged Dasein XXVII, ff. Heidegger often uses Mensch in lectures, but avoids it in BT: it presents us as one biological species among others, the 'rational animal', and neglects our peculiar understanding of being. For this reason, he invariably distinguishes his own 'analytic of Dasein' from 'philosophical anthropology', which 'is no longer a fashion but an epidemic' XXXI, ; cf.
BT, 45ff; K, ff. Dasein unifies man, avoiding the traditional tripartition into body, soul Seele, the life principle and spirit Geist, the intellectual principle BT, But if we know what we are, do we thereby know who we are? Dasein is 'in each case mine. Every man is 'for the sake of himself, [ BT, 84, The significance of the world is underpinned by Dasein's needs and purposes. Is Dasein an isolated, egotistical individual?
Only because Dasein is 'in its metaphysical essence determined by selfhood, can it as a concrete entity expressly choose itself as self or 'forgo this choice' XXVI, It does not help to introduce the I-Thou relation. XXVI, f. Dasein's egoity lies deeper than this. LX, Later, man is distinguished more sharply from Dasein. Dasein is not man, but a relationship to being diat man acquires and may lose.
Moreover Da-sein is 'between' man and the gods rather than coincident with man himself LXV, 28f. It is now man, radier than Da-sein, that should not be viewed as an instance of a genus LXV, 61 ; we ask 'who' we are or who man is LXV, ff. Da-sein has become too impersonal to allow such questions but cf. Heidegger assigns die two senses of Dasein, the traditional and his own, respectively to the 'first' and die 'odier' beginning LXV, ff. The later divergence from BT should not be exaggerated. In BT Dasein transcends to world: 'But if it is die world, in surmounting to which selfhood first ripens, then die world proves to be diat for the sake of which Dasein exists' ER, BT is no more anthropocentric than Heidegger's later work.
Sterben is distinct from abieben, das Ableben, ' to demise', biological death or dying which 'as an event that occurs is "only" empirically certain' BT, Scheler, who anticipated several Heideggerian ideas such as our tendency, intensified by modern capitalism, to conceal deadi , argued that one's non-empirical certainty of one's own deadi stems from the observation that the range of possibilities open to one narrows as one's life advances and seems to converge on the limit of a single possibility, if not to vanish altogether Scheler , 18ff. The progressive contraction of my range of options is inferred it might be objected from empirical observation, and it depends on my mortality.
If eternal youth were granted to me, I could become a general or an actor - options which are now denied to me by die ageing and mortality known to me in other ways. Heidegger presents no such arguments for the non-empirical certainty of death.
He assumes that an endless life would be unmanageable and care-less, with no way of deciding what to do or when to do it. He focuses almost exclusively on one's own deadi; even time ends with one's own death BT, 33Of. It is, he says, certain diat I shall die. It is uncertain when I shall die. I may die at any moment. I cannot do anytiiing after my deadi.
No-one else can die for me. I shall die alone. This is not to deny the soldierly comradeship induced by imminent deadi: 'The very death, which each individual man must die for himself, which reduces each individual to his own uttermost individuality, this very deadi and readiness for the sacrifice it demands creates first of all die preliminary communal space from which comradeship springs'. Comradeship springs from Angst, from 'the metaphysical nearness to the unconditioned granted only to the highest self-reliance and readiness' XXXIX, This is a case of authentic 'being towards death', Sein zum Tode, an expression formed by analogy witii Wille zum Tode, 'will to death', but covering any attitude one might have to one's own death, inauthentic e.
Heidegger calls this 'dying': 'Let Sterben be die term for the mode of being [Seinsweise] in which Dasein is towards its deadi [ What matters is not physical demise, but one's attitude to one's death during life. Vorlaufen frees one not only for death, but also for possibilities before death, my own possibilities, not everyday trivia or die menu offered to me by the They BT, It makes one a complete, self-contained person.
Heidegger's preoccupation with death does not survive the BT period cf. XX, ff; XXI, f. He corrects misinterpretations of BT's account of death and tries to show its continuing relevance. It does not affirm nihilism or die senselessness of being. Running ahead to deadi opens us BT tried 'to draw death into Dasein, in order to master Dasein in its fathomless range and so to fully measure die ground of the possibility of the truth of beyng'. But 'not everyone need perform Ulis beyng towards death and assume the Self of Dasein in this authenticity; this performance is necessary only in connection with the task of laying die ground for die question about beyng, a task which is of course not confined to philosophy.
The performance of being towards death is a duty only for the thinkers of the other beginning, but every essential man among the future creators can know of it' LXV, Later, it reveals being, but only philosophers and others involved in the preparation of a 'new beginning' need bother about it. Botii in BT and later, it is clear that philosophers need the detachment from 'everydayness' and the They induced by Vorlaufen. It is less clear how it reveals being. Heidegger suggests a 'correspondence' between death and being: 'To the extraordinariness of beyng tiiere corresponds, in the realm in which its truth is grounded, i.
Many things besides death are, however, peculiar to man. Death has lost its close link widi time: Heidegger is now more interested in long historical time-spans tiian in die time of the individual cf. LXV, f. In a later seminar he and Fink gave thought to die significance of death in Heraclitus XV, 92f. However, Heidegger often speaks too of die Unterscheidung of being and beings. In its literal sense, differre is close to die German austragen, 'to carry out, deliver, deal with, setde'.
Austrag is 'setdement, resolution [e. Hence die Differenz of being and beings is also an Austrag of diem, bringing them together as well as keeping them apart cf. ID, 63ff. If we knew only of beings, having no understanding of being, we could not relate to or 'comport ourselves' to beings as such. We would, like animals, be affected by beings XXIX, ff. To take an analogy: I am presented witii things of various colours. Some are of die same colour, 'alike' gleich. If I see two things of die same colour I may be affected by and respond to them in a distinctive way.
But I cannot see diem as alike in colour unless I have an apriori understanding of likeness Gleichheit Nil, ff. Is 'being', then, on a par widi any odier universal or general term? If I cannot see things as alike without an understanding of likeness, or trees as trees without a prior understanding of 'treeness', why is the ontological difference of more significance than the distinction between any general concept and its instances?
Being is more fundamental and pervasive than likeness, treeness or redness. Everytiiing, apart from being itself, is a being; anydiing that is red, a tree or like somediing else must already be. The difference between being and beings seems obvious, yet philosophers have tended to obliterate it. They have done so in at least four ways, each involving the elimination or demotion of being in favour of beings:. The distinction, though not this tide for it, is central to BT: 'Being and the structure of being lie beyond every entity and every feature of an entity diat diere can possibly be.
Being is die transcendens pure and simple' BT, The word Differenz, from the Latin differre lit. They have represented being as itself a being or entity, usually die supreme being, God. This refers to medieval theologians, above all Aquinas, who regarded God as identical to his own being esse , as something like pure being. They regard being as an empty universal, derived by our abstraction from beings themselves.
Being has been equated, for example, with materiality and widi perceptibility. But this overrides, firsdy, the diversity of being and of our uses of the verb 'to. Secondly, it ignores the fact that beings form a whole or world, which can never be constructed from the properties of each being taken separately. Being is often contrasted not with beings, but with becoming Plato, Nietzsche , appearance, thinking and values or the 'ought'.
This is no accident; it is an essential feature of being itself that it lends itself to precisely these contrasts. But they are not to be accepted. For being extends to whatever is supposed to contrast with it. Becoming, appearance, thinking and value - all of these are. Where does the boundary lie between being and beings? Understanding of being, however tacit and deficient, is involved in all our everyday dealings with beings. We never encounter, with no understanding of being, sheer beings, the beings that affect animals or that existed before the emergence of conscience life.
Nevertheless there are three questions that we can ask about being:. Any answer to 2 must involve some view about the being of beings. For example, 'All beings are material' implies that being is materiality. But Heidegger will not allow this to undermine the distinction between questions 1 and 2. He reformulates question 2 as 'What is the being of beings?
This is quite distinct from question 1, now reformulated as 'What is the truth or essence of being? The ontological difference is now regarded as a subordinate, 'transitional' distinction between being and beings, which is somehow generated by the simple, unique and incomparable beyng LXV, The distinction between being and beingness perhaps echoes Aquinas's distinction between esse as the actus essendi 'act of being', and esse as the 'mental uniting of predicate to subject in a proposition' Summa Theologiae, Ia, 3, 4.
The 'basic question' Grundfrage. XXXI, 73, : 'What are beings as such? Nietzsche held, in Heidegger's account, that the essence or Whatbeing of beings is 'will to power', while their existence or That-being is 'eternal recurrence of the same' e. In more recent and degenerate times many philosophers have ceased to ask even question 2, confining themselves to 'theory of knowledge', the foundations of knowledge and science.
Re-examining Heidegger to Uncover Creativity in the Iteratively Bound Performer
LXV, : 'Why are there Earth, Erde, and god s are absent. World and earth are in conflict. A world of human products and activities is established by taming and utilizing the earth on which it rests. The earth fights back, overgrowing, destroying and reclaiming our works if we do not tend and protect them. Earth and world need each other. The world rests on earth and uses earthy raw materials. Earth is revealed as earth by the world.
A temple reveals the rock on which it rests, the storm that buffets it, and the stone of which it is made OWA, 30ff. This quasi-Hegelian conflict constitutes and sustains the combatants. He also speaks of a Riss, 'rift, cleft', between earth and world. Riss is chosen because its compounds Umriss, Aufriss and Grundriss mean 'contour s , outline', 'elevation, outline' and 'sketch, outline, ground plan'. The rift between earth and world defines their contours and establishes a ground plan of human life: the rift 'is a ground plan. Gods hardly appear in OWA; man is the sole beneficiary of the earthworld conflict.
XXXIX, 47f. They are related not by Streit, 'conflict', but by Ent-gegnung. This comes from gegen, 'against, towards' and a verb gegenen, 'to come towards, approach, meet', which survives only in compounds. One of these is entgegnen, once 'to come towards, stand opposite, confront', but now 'to reply, retort'. Heidegger hyphenates Entgegnung, 'reply, retort', thus reviving the idea of opposition and encounter - not in an exclusively hostile sense - while retaining the idea of gods and men answering each other's call. He speaks of 'gods' owing to his love of ancient Greece and of nature - once the abode of the gods, but now being destroyed by technology LXV, But he disavows any definite view on the number of gods LXV, , Gods are intimately connected with man's conception of himself.
When man regards himself as an 'extant "specimen" of the genus "human being"' he has no 'claim to a coming of the god, not even a claim to the experience of the flight of the gods. This very experience presupposes that the historical human being is aware of himself as transported into the open centre of beings which are abandoned by the truth of their being' LXV, Man has no need of gods if he sees himself as just one animal species among others, only if he is conscious of his peculiar finitude as a being aware of beings as a whole.
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Man and gods arise together from beyng, like the banks formed by the surge of the river between them LXV, He also speaks of the truth of beyng as a fire that needs god and man to keep it alight. We cannot know how often the fire has burnt out before. Tf we knew this it would not be necessary to think beyng in the uniqueness of its essence' LXV, The Geviert, the 'fourfold, square', outlasts Heidegger's interest in speculative history. A Ding, 'thing', such as a jug, a bridge or a cricket-bat, lies at the intersection of the fourfold. The bat is planted on the earth beneath a sky that sheds light and warmth; the weather is a godsend; the success of the stroke is in the lap of the gods.
But we attain that simplicity only if we keep the being, each thing, in the free play [Spielraum] of its mystery and do not think to seize beyng by analysis of our already firm acquaintance with its. The fourfold is a riposte to Hegel's triangle and triads. It is also harks back to the spatial regions of BT. It is die nominalization of the defunct verb wesen, 'to be, stay, last, happen', and originally meant 'dwelling, stay, life, way of being, e t c ' It generated wesentlich and the less usual wesenhaft, 'essential'. The verb wesen also supplies the perfect participle, gewesen, of sein, 'to be', and survives in compounds: anwesend 'present' and abwesend 'absent'.
Verwesen; Verwesung, 'to decay, rot; decay', are only remotely related to wesen, though Heidegger exploits their similarity to it LXV, , Verweser, 'manager, administrator, one who stands in for [ver-] someone else', is closer to wesen. Unwesen, lit. The phrase sein Unwesen treiben, lit. The Greek ousia can mean 'essence', but Heidegger associates Wesen with Aristotie's expression to ti en einai, 'essence, lit. He explains it as meaning what a thing was, or has been, before it is actualized, and also what we understand 'earlier', already or apriori about something XXIV, , Cf.
BT, , marginal note b to The Latin essentia invariably contrasts with existentia; they refer respectively to the What-being and the Howbeing of something XXIV, Wesen is applied twice to Dasein: 'The "essence" ['Wesen'] of this being lies in its To-be [Zu-sein]. But it is not applied to Sein, 'being': 'There is no "essence of being", since being-an-essence [Wesen-sein] is itself a mode of.
The verb wesen occurs in the past tense in the coinages gewesend e , 'in tiie course of having been', and Gewesenheit, 'having-beenness' BT, In other works Wesen is often used in the non-verbal sense of 'essence'. In 'clarifying die essence' Wesenserhellung of e. This is more than an analysis of the concept of freedom or of the meaning of the word 'freedom': it involves our transcendence to a world.